We use different organizational forms of REITs (internally-advised versus externally-advised) as a natural experiment to devise a clean test of the impact of hold up versus benefits in relationship banking. Due to regulatory reasons, externally advised REITs have lower information opacity and consequently are less subject to hold up effect. Contrary to hold up and consistent with benefits accruing to borrowers, we find that the relatively more opaque internally advised REITs derive greater benefits from lending relationship for both price (loan rate), and non price terms of loan contracts (collateral, covenants and loan size). Further, relationship banks of internally advised REITs have a higher likelihood of securing repeat business from such REITs providing further evidence of the benefits of relationship lending.
Introduction
There has been a long debate in the literature on the costs and benefits of lending relationships. Theoretically, papers such as Boot and Thakor (1993) predict that relationships should result in better loan contract terms over time to borrowers while papers such as Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992) and Von-Thadden (2004) predict that borrowers should become more locked in to their banks as the lending relationship matures. Empirically, a similar dichotomy is observed. While Berger and Udell (1995) and Bharath et al (2010) find benefits of relationship lending to borrowers in terms of lower loan rates and collateral, other work (Santos and Winton,2008; Ioannidou and Ongena, 2011) find evidence of hold-up problems being an important effect of lending relationships.
While earlier work on relationship lending that focuses on small business borrowers which have fewer alternate sources of financing and therefore susceptible to hold-up problem, the fact that hold-up effect impacts publicly traded firms with several alternate sources of financing is puzzling. The approach generally taken in the literature is to take some proxy for hold-up effect and then to examine variation in bank behaviour under different scenarios. The proxies that have been used to measure the firm's susceptibility to hold up include presence of ratings (Santos and Winton, 2008) , size and analyst coverage (Bharath et al, 2011) and distance between a borrower and lender (Dass and Massa, 2011) , and duration of lending relationships (Peterson and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) ).
The problem with several of these proxies is that they can be varied or controlled by the borrower firm and the lender bank in response to capital and product market conditions, hence might not be exogenous to dependent variables used to study hold up, which is usually the loan rate charged in several studies. For example, the duration of a relationship is clearly a variable that the firm and the bank choose jointly. If the duration of a relationship is correlated with factors that determine loan rate, for example, a firm that maintains a long relationship has unobservably higher credit risk, one would see firms having higher loan rates with longer duration of relationships, something interpreted as evidence in favour of hold up. A similar argument can be made for other proxies of hold up. Consequently, documented effects of hold up and benefits of lending relationship may suffer from biases. This paper seeks to employ an alternative proxy for hold up and/or benefits of lending relationships that remains relatively stable over time and is not subject to the control of the firm except in the very long term. In particular, we use the differences in organizational form between internal and external REITs as a key identifying factor. As argued later, the difference in organizational form should result in external REITs being different from internal REITs along one important dimension -greater transparency for external REITs. Empirical evidence for this is provided in Deng et al (2011) , who demonstrate that external REITs are more transparent along a number of dimensions such as analyst forecast accuracy, bid ask spread, and earnings volatility.
An important focus of the above paper is on loan contract terms and specifically it demonstrates that the external REITs have a lower loan rate and lower likelihood of collateral, after controlling for factors known to impact these two variables.
The above paper implies that loan contract terms reflect the higher level of transparency of external REITs. Here, we focus on the incremental difference between relationship lending to internal and external REITs, again focusing on loan contract terms. Specifically, the loan contract terms we focus on are the loan rate (spread over a benchmark, usually LIBOR), a dummy variable on whether or not the loan is collateralized, the number of covenants imposed by the lender, and loan availability, which we define as the size of the given loan to the total assets of the lender.
In particular, our empirical work is in the spirit of a difference in difference approach, focusing on difference in relationship loans across internal and external REITs. After controlling for factors that impact these loan contract terms, our main results are that the external REITs derive lower benefits from lending relationship. In particular, we find that external REITs receive a lower discount in loan rate, requirement of collateral, and number of covenants, when borrowing from their relationship bank relative to internal REITs which derive larger benefits from such relationship lending. This is consistent with the fact that lower information opacity firms derive lower benefits from relationship lending, consistent for example, with models of relationship lending such as Boot and Thakor (1993) , and inconsistent with hold up type models, which imply that more informationally opaque firms should derive lower benefits from relationship lending due to the relationship bank appropriating most of the benefits from the long term relationship formation.
Specifically, internal REITs derive a relationship discount of around 50 basis points relative to the external REITs which do not receive any such discount. Given that the average spread is around 170 basis points for the entire sample, this implies that engaging a relationship bank lowers the fees by close to 30% for an internal REIT, which is an economically large discount. Second, the likelihood of pledging collateral when borrowing from a relationship bank is 1.2% lower for internal REITs relative to external REITs. Our results continue to hold after accounting for the endogeneity of lending relationships using the distance between the bank and borrower to instrument for the likelihood of relationship formation.
Second, we also examine the likelihood of repeat business for the relationship banks of internal and external REITs. Bharath et al (2007) document that one of the important benefits of relationship lending from the bank's perspective is that the relationship bank is much more likely to secure future lending business from the borrowing firm. If external REITs derive fewer relationship lending benefits, this implies that they should be less likely to repeat the same banks in future lending transactions. To test this, we use a model of bank choice following the method developed Ljungqvist et al (2006) for underwriter choice. For each loan, we develop a model of borrower's choice of the bank for a given loan transaction based on market share of the bank in the prior year, past lending relationships and other control variables. The critical variable of interest is the interaction of relationships with the external REIT status. We find that this interaction has a negative effect on the likelihood of future retention, implying that external REITs are less likely to retain their relationship banks in future loan business.
To summarize, we find that lending relationships matter less, both for external REITs as well as their lending banks. There is no evidence for hold-up effect in our sample; rather all the evidence points in favour of the less transparent internal REITs deriving large benefits of relationship lending.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we provide some institutional background about internal and external REITs, and develop hypotheses to be tested in this paper. In Section 3, we provide details on the data collection and sample construction. In Section 4 and 5, we conduct univariate and multivariate tests of the hypotheses. Lastly in Section 6, we conclude with main findings and directions for future research.
Institutional Background on REITs
Chan, Erikson and Wang (2003) provide a detailed analysis of the REIT industry as well as differences between internal and external REITs. This section draws on heavily insights from their text. A REIT is defined as a corporation that invests principally in real estate and/or mortgages and elects a special tax treatment as a REIT. They are essentially closed-end investment companies that provide a passive medium for investors to invest in income producing real estate properties and income.
Prior to 1986, REITs were designed to be passive investment vehicles for public investors to tap into real estate market. As a result, they were prohibited from actively trading their
properties in the open market or directly managing them. Further, they were required to either employ outside property management firms or lease their properties. The tax reform act of 1986 allowed REITs to manage their own portfolios as well as allowing them to develop their own properties.
REITs that continued with the old charter of management by external advisors are called external REITs, whereas those that integrate the advising function within the organization are called internal REITs. Beginning in 1987, many REITs switched from their previous externally advised form and hired internal professional management, becoming internally advised.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that internal REITs pursued more aggressive growth strategies via the acquisition and development of properties.
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The coexistence of two REITs forms is puzzling since the internally-advised REITs are believed to be more efficient than the old styled externally-advised REITs. Several leading REIT experts in the industry predicted that the self-advised and self-managed types of REITs, i.e., internal REITs, would dominate the industry (Linneman, 1997) . This view was driven by the belief that internally advised REITs, similar to operating companies, would be able to improve profits by expanding revenues or controlling expenses. Capozza and Seguin (1998) found that during the period from 1985 to 1992, internally-advised REITs outperform externally-advised REITs by more than 7%, and also that the externally-advised REITs typically use more debt and pay higher interest rates on debt than do the internally-advised variety.
The above arguments are convincing, the basic premise being that agency conflicts between the external advisors and the REIT firms themselves, would cause this organizational form to underperform, ultimately leading to its demise. However, we observe few conversions from external to internal advisors after 1996. As we will see, internally advised REITs still comprise of around 20% of the listed REITs.
As mentioned in the introduction, Deng et al (2011) postulate that internally advised REITs, while possibly subject to greater agency costs, also have some advantages. In particular, the study shows that the external management structure allows a greater degree of transparency of the operations of the REIT to the market place. Consistent with this hypothesis, this paper shows that lenders are less likely to require collateral or covenants for external REITs. Lastly, the above paper also shows that external REITs have lower dispersion of analyst forecasts, lower bid ask spreads and lower earnings volatility, all consistent with greater information being available to the market place.
Hypotheses
The above suggests that there are fundamental differences in the two organizational forms which lead to different types of benefits for the two types of REITs. In particular, external REITs are less subject to problems of information asymmetry as well as risk shifting. We will examine the impact of these on loan contract terms in the context of relationship banking.
REIT Organizational Form, Lending Relationships and Loan Rate
Theoretically, lending relationships have been posited to reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard problems between borrowers and lenders (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Boot and Thakor, 2000; Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995) . Further, a long run relationship between borrowers and lenders can also reduce moral hazard problems between lenders and other lenders (in the case of syndicated loans, Sufi, 2007; Bharath et al, 2011) . On the other hand, a lending relationship may also result in a borrower being locked in to its borrowers (Sharpe (1990 , Rajan (1992 ).
To the extent that relationship benefits empirically dominate and these benefits are passed on to borrowers in terms of more favourable loan contract terms, one should expect that firms having stronger lending relationships with their lenders are to get better loan contract terms, in terms of lower loan rates. Further, since the relationship benefits that accrue to the banks and borrowers are directly proportional to the degree of informational frictions with respect to the outside capital market (Boot, 2000) , one should expect that relationship lending is most beneficial to firms with higher degree of informational asymmetry with regard to outside investors.
On the other hand, if the hold-up effect dominates, this should mean that firms with greater degree of information asymmetry should be subject to greater hold-up costs. Thus, they should be less subject to hold up. This implies that internal REITs should be subject to a greater degree of hold up, if it exists in the sample. 
REIT Organizational Form, Lending Relationships and Non Price Terms
Next, we examine the impact of lending relationship on non-price terms. Specifically, we examine focus on non-price terms -the requirement of collateral, the number of covenants required, and the loan availability.
Impact on Collateral
First, we discuss the determinants of collateral. Among the prominent theories of collateral requirement, Stultz and Johnson (1985) imply that collateral is demanded by lenders for high moral hazard borrowers to mitigate the effects of borrower moral hazard whereas signalling theories of collateral such as Besanko and Thakor (1987) imply that collateral is used as signalling device by low risk borrowers. Empirically, several papers such as Berger and Udell (1990) and Jiminez and Saurina (2006) 
Impact on Covenants
Next, we examine the impact of organizational form on covenant requirement. While there are many theories on the impact of relationship benefits on the loan rate, relatively fewer papers deal with covenant restrictions. Classic papers such as Smith and Warner (1979) examine the role of covenants largely in the context of public debt contracts where there is little monitoring by dispersed bondholders. Theoretically, Berlin and Mester (1992) and Rajan and Winton (1995) are among the few that have a theoretical treatment of covenants in the context of bank lending. Berlin and Mester (1992) 
Impact on Loan Size
There are few formal models of credit rationing in terms of size of the loan, although there is a large literature of financial constraints starting with Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) that suggests that firms face significant costs of external financing. If firms do face such costs, then this implies that firms should prefer larger size of loans. For individual loans, Evans and Jovanic (1989) find strong empirical evidence for loan size rationing. Theoretically, a model by Schreft and Villamil (1992) derives quantity rationing by banks as the optimal response in the presence of information asymmetry. In their model, all borrowers except the largest are rationed in terms of the quantity of the loan. A more recent model by Zeng (2007) also develops a role for size in the context of lending. They demonstrate that firms would prefer larger size of debt, even in the presence of financial intermediaries and credit rationing. To the extent that relationship banking can mitigate informational frictions, relationship banks should be willing to offer larger size loans to their borrowers. Again, with benefits to relationship lending, internal REITs should derive larger benefits in terms of loan size whereas with hold up, the opposite should be true. 
Relationship Benefits from the Perspective of Banks
Next, we examine the differential impact of these benefits from the banks' perspective.
To the extent that the benefits of lending relationship are different for internal and external REITs, this also has implications for differences in the likelihood of repeat business across these two organizational forms. In particular, Bharath et al (2007) document that an important benefit of maintaining lending relationships from a bank's perspective is a large increase in the likelihood of repeat business. If relationship benefits dominate, then internal REITs should derive greater benefits of repeat business and consequently, as more likely to use their relationship banks for future loan transactions. On the other hand, if hold up dominates, the reverse should be true. This leads to the following hypothesis. Of course, there is a possibility that both effects exactly offset each other in which case we should observe no effect.
Data and Sample Selection
Our sample includes all U.S. REITs for which data are available in Loan Pricing
Corporation (LPC) and COMPUSTAT. Data on individual loan facilities is obtained from the DealScan database maintained by the LPC. LPC has been collecting information on loans to large U.S. corporations primarily through self-reporting by lenders, SEC filings, and its staff reporters.
While the LPC database provides comprehensive information on loan contract terms (LIBOR spread, maturity, collateral, etc.), it does not provide much information on borrowers. We manually match the borrowers in the LPC database with the merged CRSP and COMPUSTAT database using a text-matching algorithm outlined in Engelberg and Sankaraguruswamy (2007) . The output from the algorithm is verified by hand matching. For those REITs in the LPC database that provide no matches using the algorithm, again we hand match directly to CRSP and COMPUSTAT. The final sample at the end of this matching results in a sample of 228 REITs.
We exclude all loans rated 'D' which indicates that the borrower had defaulted. As such, such loans are typically DIP superpriority loans and therefore an analysis of such loans would confound the impact of relationship lending with the impact of the bargaining and negotiations that are typical in US bankruptcies.
To get the advisor status of each REIT firm, we searched manually from LexisNexis and SEC filings for the company business description. A REIT is recorded as internally advised status if it is found to be internally advised or internally managed in its SEC filings or related news articles, and similar for externally advised REITs. Out of the 228 REITs, we are able to classify 150 as internal REITs and 40 as external REITs. We are unable to classify the remaining 38
REITs and consequently exclude these from our analysis. Using the same sources, we find that our sample consists of 192 equity REITs, 17 mortgage REITs, 3 hybrid REITs and 6 REITs which we are unable to classify into these categories.
We then use COMPUSTAT to extract data on accounting variables for the given company. To ensure that we only use accounting information that is publicly available at the time of the loan we employ the following procedure: For those loans made in calendar year t, if the loan activation date is 6 months or later than the fiscal year ending month in calendar year t, we use the data of that fiscal year. If the loan activation date is less than 6 months after the fiscal year ending month, we use the data from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1.
Construction of Lending Relationship Measures
Since lending relationships form a central variable around which the empirical analysis is based on, we provide a detailed explanation of the construction of the two relationship measures here. We construct the relationship measures for a particular loan by searching all the previous loans (over the previous 5-year window) of that borrower as recorded in the LPC database. We note the identity of all the lead banks on these prior loans and if at least one of the lead banks for loan We had been a lead lender in the past we classify loan as a relationship loan. Since the identification of the "lead" bank (or banks) for a particular loan facility is the basic building block of classifying a loan as relationship or non-relationship, we define this below.
While the LPC database contains a field that describes the lender's role, it does not have a uniform and consistent methodology to classify which bank is the lead bank. It includes a number of descriptions such as "arranger", "administrative agent", "agent", or "lead manager"
that roughly correspond to the lead bank status of the lender. To ensure that we do not mislabel the lead bank we follow a simple rule. Any bank(s) that is (are) not described as a "participant" is (are) treated as a lead bank. All relationship measures are constructed using any bank retained in a lead role as defined above. Further, the LPC database has numerous transactions where subsidiaries of banks were involved. We use the above databases to find the ultimate parent of the given lender. Our matching procedure is conservative in that we assign a match only if we are reasonably sure of the ultimate parent. This, as well as possible M&A that we missed collecting data on, implies that relationship loans may be classified as non-relationship loans (for example, for a subsidiary that was not an independent bank, but classified as one), but the reverse would not be true. This would bias against finding any effect of relationship in our sample.
Measures of Loan Contract Terms and Benefits to Banks
Following Drucker and Puri (2005), we use the LPC reported "All-in-Spread-Drawn" (AISD) as the measure of the cost for a loan. AISD is the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee. We also use collateral requirement as a measure of the cost of loan, since exemption of collateral requirement designate a certain level of benefit that the lenders enjoy.
Collected from the LPC database, the dummy variable "collateral" equals 1 if the loan facility was secured and 0 otherwise. Since the LPC database has a missing value for the secured field for a large number of observations, we assume that observations that have a missing value for the collateral are uncollateralized. 
Univariate Analysis
In this section, we present summary statistics on the data sample and perform univariate tests of the hypotheses developed in Section 3. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of loan characteristics such as loan facility amount and spread, as well as borrower characteristics such as total assets and leverage ratio, for the two different REIT types. Panel A shows the results for the full sample, and Panels B and C show the results for the internal and external REITs subsamples respectively. There are about 3 times more loans taken by internal REITs relative to external REITs, roughly consistent with the fractions of these in the sample as well.
Comparing Panels B and C, we find that external REITs are typically smaller in size than internal REITs as in Capozza and Segiun (2000) . Despite the smaller size, internal REITs are associated with higher loans rates and collateral requirements and lower maturity of loans. REITs than their external peers, which is consistent with the main findings in Deng et al (2001) .
This actually provides an explanation for the external advisor puzzle in the REIT literature which has been studied by many other researchers in the real estate finance field such as Capozza and
Seguin (2000) (see also Chan, Erickson & Wang, 2003; Ambrose and Linneman, 2001) .
In Bharath et al (2011) . Thus, at least in the overall sample, relationship lending benefits appear to overweigh any hold-up costs.
However, the number of covenants required for relationship loans is actually higher than for non-relationship loans, both for internal and external REITs, inconsistent with the hypothesis that relationship banks would impose fewer restrictions on their borrowers. However, on an overall basis, the evidence favours the hypothesis that net benefits of relationship lending accrue to borrowers.
However, some of these differences in loan contract terms across relationship and nonrelationship loans may be driven by differences in borrower characteristics across these two sets of firms. To investigate this, we provide statistics on borrower characteristics across of relationship and non-relationship loans. We find that those borrowers that borrow from their relationship bank tend to be much larger and have lower leverage. The market to book ratio is also higher for relationship borrowers. Thus, some of the differences between relationship and non-relationship loan contract terms may be driven by differences in borrower characteristics.
Next, we stratify the relationship loans into those made to external REITs and those made to internal REITs. The results are shown in Table 4 , panel B (for external REITs) and Table 4 , Panel C (for internal REITs). Surprisingly, we find little difference between relationship and nonrelationship loans for external REITs in terms of loan rate, loan size and collateral requirement.
The loan spread, facility size, maturity are not significantly different between relationship loans and non-relationship loans. The differences in terms of borrower characteristics are also quite small and mostly insignificant.
In contrast, there are significant differences between relationship and non-relationship loans for internal REITs. That is to say, conditional on being an internal REIT, having prior lending relationship provides great benefit in terms of loan rate, collateral, etc. The AISD is significantly less for relationship loans than non-relationship loans by about 15bp, and the collateral requirement is reduced by about 50%. This result supports the hypothesis that external
REITs enjoy lower benefits relative to internal REITs.
Overall, the results of the univariate analysis imply that external REITs have a lower loan rate and collateral relative to internal REITs. Further, in an overall basis, relationship lending is beneficial to borrowers resulting in a lower interest rate and collateral. When the results are stratified by REIT type, the benefits of relationship lending are concentrated on internal REITs whereas external REITs do not derive any benefits of relationship lending, at least in terms of loan rate and collateral requirement.
Multivariate Analysis
The results in the previous section demonstrated that broad support for Hypothesis 1 and for relationship lending benefits accruing primarily to internal REITs (Relationship lending dominates relative to hold up). However, to the extent that there are differences in borrower characteristics between relationship and non-relationship loans and between internal and external REIT loans, the differences in loan rate and collateral may be reflecting these differences rather than any fundamental differences due to organizational form. To account for these, this section conducts multivariate analysis to account for these differences to examine if the differences continue to persist after differences in borrower characteristics are accounted for.
Lending Relationships and Loan Rate
The results in Section 4 suggest that loan contract terms reflect the greater transparency of external REITs. In this sub-section, we proceed to test if the benefits of lending relationships differ systematically across internal and external REITs. To test this, we use empirical specifications for the loan rate as follows:
Where ‫ܦܵܫܣ‬ , is the spread charged for the k th loan by firm i. ܺ ,, are the controls variables for this loan, which includes firm specific controls, loan specific controls, an external REIT dummy, as well as time dummies to control for possible macroeconomics effects at the time of loan origination. A detailed definition of all the control variables used is provided in Appendix A.
Recall from hypotheses 1 that benefits of relationship lending should be lower for external REITs if relationship benefits dominate and higher for external REITs if hold up costs dominate. Given the empirical specification, the coefficient β 1 measures the effect of relationship on internal REITs and the coefficient β 2 measures incremental effect of relationship on external REITs relative to internal REITs. If hold up effects dominates, one should expect β 1 to be positive (reflecting aggregate hold-up effects) and β 2 to be negative (reflecting lower hold up for external REITs). On the other hand, if relationship benefits dominate, one should expect a negative sign for β 1 (reflecting aggregate benefits) and positive sign for β 2 reflecting lower benefits from relationship lending for external REITs.
Of course, one may observe β 1 to be insignificantly different from zero, implying that neither hold up nor benefits dominates for internal REITs, but at the same time, observe a positive or negative sign for β 2 , reflecting differences in relationship lending benefits or costs of hold up for external REITs relative to internal REITs. Thus, the sign of the interaction term is the main variable of interest in the empirical specifications. Table 5 is consistent with the above.
Market to book ratio does not have any predicted sign in the loan rate. On one hand, high market to book firms may be firms with more intangible assets, and therefore, more risky. On the other hand, low market to book is often interpreted as a proxy for distress, and therefore, may have a positive impact on loan rate. As such, given that this study focuses only on REITs, where the assets should mostly be tangible, market to book is more likely a proxy for distress risk. The negative coefficient on market to book is more consistent with the latter explanation, although there is no agreement in the literature as to what the impact of market to book on loan rates should be.
We also include maturity of the loan as a potential control variable. Theoretically, Flannery (1986) implies that loan maturity should decrease with the risk of the borrower while Diamond (1991) implies that the there should be a non-monotonic relationship of between borrower risk and loan maturity, with medium risk borrowers choosing long term loans whereas high and low risk borrowers should have shorter maturity loans. Thus, the net impact of maturity on the loan rate is uncertain. We find no effect on the aggregate level.
To account for year specific effects (for example, an increase in the risk premium), we include year specific dummies in all regression specifications subsequently. To account for credit risk not captured in the existing variables, we include dummy variables for the rating of the borrower at the time of loan origination with non rated firms treated as a separate category. In addition, because different types of loans may have different credit risk profiles (for example, term loans may differ from lines of credit), we include a loan type dummy to control for these differences.
In models 2 and 5 of table 5, we add external status dummy to both the models, and we find both of the two variables (relationship strength and external status) continue to be significant as before with similar coefficient estimates. Lastly, in models 3 and 6, we interact both measures of relationship strength with the external status dummy, with REL (Number) in specification 3
and REL (Amount) in specification 6. We find a strong positive coefficient of the interaction term. This suggests that external REITs have much lower relationship benefits relative to internal REITs. In fact, the net benefit from relationship lending appears to be zero for external REITs, at least based on the loan rate.
Endogeneity of Relationship Formation
The previous table suggests large economic effects of maintaining relationships for REITs. However, these results could be biased because of potential endogeneity of the relationship variable. In particular, firms that form relationships may have unobservably lower credit risk, for example, if banks were cherry picking borrowers with lower credit risk to form long term relationships. On the other hand, the reverse could also be true, with firms that have unobservably higher credit risk choosing to form stronger relationships. Under either scenario, the effect of the relationship lending variables used (REL(Amount) or REL(Number)) may be biased.
Some evidence for such self-selection in terms of observable variables that impact credit risk is found in Table 4 . If one examines the differences in relationship and non-relationship loans, it can be seen that relationship loans are taken by larger firms with lower leverage (likely with lower credit risk). Thus, the observable effects of lower rates for relationship loans may be due to lower credit risk. While the specification includes ratings of the firm, which should control for such effect, nevertheless, we investigate if an alternative approach based on instrumental variables impacts the results.
To implement this approach, we need to have an instrument that is correlated with the likelihood of relationship formation, but otherwise should not impact loan rates directly. Several papers argue that distance may be important in the formation of lending relationships (Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005) . To compute the distance, we follow approach in Dass and Massa (2011) by using the spherical distance between the headquarters of the REIT and the headquarters of the lead bank as the measure of distance. 5 Since the loans made are typically quite large, these decisions would likely be made at the headquarters level. As such, Dass and Massa (2011) use this distance as the proxy for lending relationship directly (without computing the relationship strength as we do) and find significant effects using this variable.
First, before proceeding to estimate the IV estimation, we conduct the Durbin and the Hausman-Wu test for whether the relationship strength variables we use are indeed endogenous.
For both REL(Number) and REL (Amount), both tests reject null hypothesis of that these variables are exogenous at the 1% level of significance for the specifications in Table 5 . This implies that we do have to account for the potential endogeneity of these relationship variables in the specification in Table 5 .
Next, we proceed to estimate the first stage regression using the log of the distance between the headquarters of the bank retained in the given loan deal as the instrument that determines the likelihood of retention of a given bank. In unreported results, this first stage regression confirms the finding of several prior papers that lower distance leads to a greater likelihood of relationship formation. The results of the second stage regression shows in Table 6 show similar results as in Table 5 . However, the magnitude of relationship lending jumps significantly in the IV estimation. This is similar to other studies of relationship lending (Berger at al, 2005) such as where estimates from IV estimation are much larger than that from OLS estimation. More importantly, the interaction of relationships and external dummy continue to be positive and significant implying that relationship lending results in lower benefits for external REITs relative to internal REITs. Incidentally, the difference in relationship benefits for internal and external REITs is still around 30 basis points, similar to the OLS specification.
Overall, the results of this subsection imply that external REITs derive lower benefits from relationship lending relative to internal REITs consistent with benefits accruing to the more informationally opaque internal REITs.
Lending Relationships and Non-Price Terms of Loan Contracts
The previous subsection documents the broad support for the fact that external REITs have lower benefits of relationship lending in terms of loan rates. This sub-section investigates if similar results exist in other terms of the loan contracts -namely collateral, covenants, and loan size. To test this, we use empirical specifications for the loan rate as follows:
Where ‫݈ܽݎ݁ݐ݈݈ܽܥ‬ , is a dummy variable for collateral requirement for the k th loan by firm ݅, ‫ݏݐ݊ܽ݊݁ݒܥ‬ , is the number of covenant requirement in the loan contract for the k th loan by firm ݅, and ‫݊ܽܮ‬ ‫݁ݖ݅ܵ‬ , is the loan amount scaled by the total assets of the borrower firm for the k th loan by firm ݅. ܺ ,, are the controls variables for this loan, which includes firm specific controls, loan specific controls, an external REIT dummy, as well as time dummies to control for possible macroeconomics effects at the time of loan origination. A detailed definition of all the control variables used is provided in Appendix A.
Effect on Collateral
Given the earlier endogeneity of relationships, we test whether the relationship variables are endogenous in a simple probit specification. The χ 2 statistic for the Wald test for exogeneity has a value of 3.76, which corresponds to a p value of 0.0524. Thus, at conventional levels of significance, the relationship variable is endogenous.
Therefore, using the same approach as that for loan rates, we estimate an instrumental variables regression using the distance between the borrower and lender as the instrument for relationship formation. Specifications 3 and 6, which include the interaction of relationship coefficient with the external dummy are most relevant here. While relationships have a strong negative impact on collateral (a 1% change in the relationship coefficient leads to a 1.8% reduction in the likelihood of collateral requirement), the interaction between external and relationships, while positive as predicted if relationship benefits are present, is marginally insignificant in one specification and significantly positive in another specification.
Since it is well known that the marginal effects in a logistic or probit regression is not equal to the coefficient estimate unlike in an OLS specification, we report the marginal effects of all variables rather than the coefficient estimate themselves. Other variables are as expectedlarger size firms have lower likelihood of collateral consistent with lower risk shifting incentives.
Higher leverage firms have a higher likelihood of collateral.
Market to book has an ambiguous prediction. On one hand, higher market to book firms may have more growth options and therefore have a greater chance of asset substitution. Such firms may require collateral to curb risk shifting incentives. On the other hand, lower market to book may reflect larger credit risk. Based on the results in the loan rate regression, we expect the latter factor to prevail. In fact, market to book has a negative marginal effect on the collateral, consistent with the notion that high market to book firms have lower credit risk and lower risk shifting incentives.
Effect on Covenants and Loan Size
We test for the endogeneity of relationships using a specification similar to equation (1) for the number of covenants in imposed as well as the loan size scaled by total assets. In both cases, the χ
The results for these regressions use a specification similar to equation 1. In both cases, the interaction of relationships and the external dummy is positive, while relationships themselves have a negative impact on covenants and loan amount.
Lending Relationships and Future Likelihood of Retention of Relationship Banks
The previous two subsections examined the benefits and costs of relationship lending from the perspective of borrowing firms and documented that external REITs have lower benefits of relationship lending relative to internal REITs. Since one important benefit of relationship lending from the bank's perspective is the likelihood of repeat business from the same borrowing firm, it follows that firms that do not get a large benefit from relationship lending should be less To ensure that the variable RETAIN takes a value of 1 for at least one bank for each loan transaction, we only use those loan transactions where one of the lead banks was ranked in the top-20 banks by market share in the prior year was retained as a lead bank. This allows us to retain 73% by number of our original sample. Our data set consists of over 37,000 loan-bank pairs which is the unit of observation in our regression model below. The empirical model is given as follows: relationships in the overall sample and the sign of β 3 will give an estimate of the relative importance of relationships for internal and external REITs in the retention decision. Table 9 displays the results of this regression. Model 1 shows that lagged market share of the bank is highly significant both economically and statistically. Models 2 and 4 add relationship strength computed using dollar value (REL(Amount)) and number of loans (REL (Number)). In both cases, relationships are highly significant confirming earlier results of bank choice for industrial firms documented by Bharath et al (2007) . Lastly, in models 3 and 5, the negative impact of interaction suggests that external REITs are less likely to retain their relationship bank relative to internal REITs.
Conclusion
The pros and cons of lending relationship have been studies extensively by various researchers. This paper analyses the hold-up problem in a unique setting by examining lending relationship and the cost of bank loans of two different REIT forms, i.e., internal versus external.
The coexistence of the two REIT forms provides an ideal setting for testing the impact of potential information opacity problems and the effect on the cost of bank loans.
The empirical evidence we have identified in this study provides support for the hypothesis that lending relationship provides less benefit for externally advised REITs. Since the externally advised REITs are less informationally opaque, the lenders have less potential to generate useful proprietary information from the lending relationship, which leads to fewer discounts on relationship loans for external advised REITs.
Appendix A -Definition of Variables
AISD is the "All In Spread-Drawn", which is the all-inclusive cost of a drawn loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee and is reported in basis points.
Loan Amount is the dollar amount of loan facility in millions.
Maturity is length in months between facility activation date and maturity date.
Collateral is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower needs to pledge collateral to the lender in the loan contract.
‫ݏݐ݊ܽ݊݁ݒܥ‬ is the number of covenant requirement in the loan contract.
Total Assets is the book value of assets of the borrower in millions as reported in the COMPUSTAT.
Market to book is the ratio of (Book value of assets -Book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets.
Facility Size is the dollar amount of loan facility in millions.
REL(Number)
is the ratio of the number of loans taken from the lead bank(s) to total number of loans taken by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan.
REL(Amount)
is the ratio of dollar value of deals with the lead bank(s) to total dollar value of loans borrowed by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan). For a facility with multiple lead banks, the maximum REL(Number) or REL(Amount) value among all the lead banks is used.
Log(Maturity) is logarithm of the length of the loan measured in months between facility activation date and maturity date.
Log(Loan size) is logarithm of the loan facility size in millions of real year 2000 dollars.
External is a dummy variable that equals one if the REIT is externally-advised and zero otherwise.
External*REL(Number) is the interaction term between External and REL(Number).

External*REL(Amount) is the interaction term between External and REL(Amount).
Log(Assets) is the natural log of book value of assets in real year 2000 dollars of the borrower as reported in the COMPUSTAT.
Leverage is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of assets.
Retained is a measure of future repeat loan transaction from the same lender. It is a dummy variable which equals 1 if any one of the borrower's top 20 lenders in the previous year is retained by the borrower for the current loan, and 0 otherwise.
Table 1 Summary Statistics for Key Loan and Borrower Characteristics
AISD is the "All In Spread-Drawn", which is the all-inclusive cost of a drawn loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee and is reported in basis points. Loan Amount is the dollar amount of loan facility in millions. Maturity is length in months between facility activation date and maturity date. Collateral is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower needs to pledge collateral to the lender in the loan contract. Total Assets is the book value of assets of the borrower in millions as reported in the COMPUSTAT. Market to book is the ratio of (Book value of assets -Book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. All values are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 9  19  28  1997  221  172  49  116  47  163  56  2  58  1998  327  208  119  149  116  265  59  3  62  1999  134  101  33  67  27  94  34  6  40  2000  286  246  40  202  34  236  44  6  50  2001  126  101  25  80  23  103  21  2  23  2002  165  145  20  95  10  105  50  10  60  2003  160  140  20  91  19  110  49  1  50  2004  257  217  40  187  35  222  30  5  35  2005  345  244  101  166  87  253  78  14  92  2006  367  268  99  177  82  259  91  17  108  2007  243  167  76  135  71  206  32  5  37  2008  93  48  45  44  44  88  4  1  5  2009  31  24  7  20  6  26  4  1  5   Total  3102  2241  861  1654  744  2398  587  117  704 The table below provides the descriptive statistics for the sample of loan facilities by whether the REIT has a lending relationship. The statistics are reported separately for loans taken from relationship lenders and loans taken from non-relationship lenders. For any particular loan facility, we classify a loan as from relationship lender if any of the lead lenders for that loan facility had been a lead lender on any loans to that borrower in the 5 years preceding the loan facility. AISD is the "All In Spread-Drawn", which is the all-inclusive cost of a drawn loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee and is reported in basis points. Facility Size is the dollar amount of loan facility in millions.
Maturity is length in months between facility activation date and maturity date. Collateral is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower needs to pledge collateral to the lender in the loan contract. Total Assets is the book value of assets of the borrower in millions as reported in the COMPUSTAT. Leverage is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Market to book is the ratio of (Book value of assets -Book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by book value of assets. All values are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. The dependant variable AISD is the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee in basis points. External is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the REIT is an externally advised REIT and 0 otherwise. REL(Number) is the ratio of the number of loans taken from the lead bank(s) to total number of loans taken by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan, and REL(Amount) is the ratio of dollar value of deals with the lead bank(s) to total dollar value of loans borrowed by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan). Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. (*** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at ten percent level). See Appendix A for a detailed definition of all variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table 6 : Endogeneity of Relationships -Impact on Loan Rate using IV Estimation The dependant variable for the second stage regressions, AISD is the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee in basis points. External is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the REIT is an externally advised REIT and 0 otherwise. REL(Number) is the ratio of the number of loans taken from the lead bank(s) to total number of loans taken by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan, and REL(Amount) is the ratio of dollar value of deals with the lead bank(s) to total dollar value of loans borrowed by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan). Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. Dummy variables for year, loan type, and ratings are included in all specifications. *** Significant at one percent level, ** Significant at five percent level ,* Significant at ten percent level. See Appendix A for a detailed definition of all variables.
(1) The dependant variable Collateral is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a loan facility is secured by collateral and 0 otherwise. We measure lending relationship strength in 2 different ways: REL(Number) is the ratio of the number of deals with the lead bank(s) to the total number of loans borrowed by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan, and REL(Amount) is ratio of dollar value of deals with the lead bank(s) to total dollar value of loans borrowed by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan). All the control variables used in Table 6 In panel A, the dependent variable is the total number of covenants imposed in the loan. In panel B, the dependent variable is the loan size scaled by the total assets of the borrower. We measure lending relationship strength in 2 different ways: REL(Number) is the ratio of the number of deals with the lead bank(s) to the total number of loans borrowed by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan, and REL(Amount) is ratio of dollar value of deals with the lead bank(s) to total dollar value of loans borrowed by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan). All the control variables used in Table 6 The dependent variable retained is a measure of future repeat loan transaction from the same lender. It is a dummy variable which equals 1 if any one of the borrower's top 20 lenders in the previous year is retained by the borrower for the current loan, and 0 otherwise. REL(Number) is the ratio of the number of deals with the lead bank(s) to total number of loans taken by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan, and REL(Amount) is the ratio of dollar value of deals with the lead bank(s) to total dollar value of loans taken by the firm in the last 5 years before the current loan. External is the dummy variable with 1 indicating whether a RETI is externally advised and 0 otherwise. Market share is a measure of the market share of the lender bank in terms of loan volume, and is calculated as the ratio of the total deal value for each lender year to the total deal value in that year. Column 1 is the baseline model which tests the effect of lender's market share in the loan market on the lender retention rate. Column 2 and column 4 test the lending relationship strength on lender retention rate in terms of Amount of loans REL(Amount) and Number of loans REL(Number) respectively. Column 3 and 5 test the specific effect of the interaction of external status and relationship strength measures, also in terms of Amount of loans REL(Amount) and Number of loans REL(Number) respectively.
(1) 
